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Courting the People:  
Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide
This is a draft of the short law review article “Courting the People”  
before it was published in 89 Boston University L. Rev. 539 (2009.)
Lani Guinier
Bennett Boskey Professor of Law
A
merica’s first black President signed his first major piece of legisla-
tion on January 9, 009: the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. Since 
the Act carried Lilly Ledbetter’s name, she fittingly stood beaming by 
President Obama’s side during the signing ceremony. For nineteen years, 
however, this seventy-year-old grandmother had less reason to be joyful, 
working in supervisory blue-collar jobs in a Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
plant in Gadsden, Alabama, earning fifteen to forty percent less than her 
male counterparts. This pay gap, which resulted from receiving smaller 
raises than the men, “added up and multiplied” over the years.4 But Led-
better did not discover the disparity until she was nearing retirement 
and “only started to get hard evidence of discrimination when someone 
anonymously left a piece of paper” in her mailbox listing the salaries 
of the men who held the same job.5 Ledbetter sued and a federal jury 
awarded her $,776 in back pay and more than $ million in puni-
tive damages, finding that it was “more likely than not that [Goodyear] 
paid [Ledbetter] a[n] unequal salary because of her sex.”6 The Supreme 
Court nullified that verdict. The five-Justice majority held that Ledbetter 
waived her right to sue by failing to file her complaint within 80 days 
of the first act of discrimination.7 In Ledbetter’s words, the Court “sided 
with big business. They said I should have filed my complaint within six 
months of Goodyear’s first decision to pay me less, even though I didn’t 5
know that’s what they were doing.”8 By contrast, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act sided with ordinary working women across the nation.
  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, on behalf of herself and three colleagues, 
dissented from the Court’s May 007 decision.9 A leading litigator and 
advocate for women’s equality before taking her seat on the Court,0 Jus-
tice Ginsburg read her dissent aloud from the bench—an act that, in 
her own words, reflects “more than ordinary disagreement.” Her oral 
dissent, which made the front page of the Washington Post, signaled that 
something had gone “egregiously wrong.” In a stinging rebuke to the 
Court majority, she used the personal pronoun, speaking not to her col-
leagues but directly to the other “you’s” in her audience—women who, 
despite suspecting something askew in their own jobs, were reluctant to 
rock the boat as the only women in all-male positions:
Indeed initially you may not know the men are receiving more for 
substantially similar work. . . . If you sue only when the pay disparity 
becomes steady and large enough to enable you to mount a winnable 
case, you will be cut off at the Court’s threshold for suing too late.4
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reflected an acute sense, missing from the 
majority’s opinion, of the circumstances surrounding women in male-
dominated workplaces. In a job previously filled only by men, women 
“understandably may be anxious to avoid making waves.”5
  Justice Ginsburg was courting the people.6 Her oral dissent and sub-
sequent remarks hinted at a democratizing form of judicial speech that, 
were it heard, could be easily understood by those outside the court-
room.7 By speaking colloquially—using the personal pronoun “you” to 
address her audience—Justice Ginsburg signaled to ordinary women that 
the majority should not have the last word on the meaning of pay dis-
crimination. Her goal was to engage an external audience in a conversa-
tion about our country’s commitment to equal pay for equal work.8
  While Justice Ginsburg spoke frankly to and about the Lilly Ledbetters 
of the world, her real target was the legislature. Appalled by the Court’s 
“cramped interpretation” of a congressional statute to justify its decision 
nullifying the favorable jury verdict, Justice Ginsburg explicitly stated 5
that the “ball again lies in Congress’s court.”9 During a public conversa-
tion in September 008, then-Harvard Law School Dean Elena Kagan 
asked Justice Ginsburg to describe her intended audience in Ledbetter. 
Ginsburg replied: “[I]t was Congress. Speaking to Congress, I said, ‘You 
did not mean what the Court said. So fix it.’”0
  Democrats in Congress responded quickly. Initially called the Fair Pay 
Restoration Act, the House-passed bill would have eliminated the Court-
sanctioned time limit. That bill, however, died in the Senate, where 
Republicans—including John McCain—publicly denounced it.
  As the initial Fair Pay Restoration Act languished in Congress, Lilly 
Ledbetter emerged as a real presence in the 008 election campaign. 
Despite her initial misgivings about partisan campaigning, she was infu-
riated by John McCain’s refusal to support a congressional fix. She cut an 
ad4 for Barack Obama that had a “stratospheric effect” when poll-tested 
by Fox News’s political consultant Frank Luntz.5 In August 008, Led-
better was a featured speaker at the Democratic National Convention 
in Denver.6 There, as well as in her testimony before Congress, she ac-
knowledged the significance of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent both in affirm-
ing her concerns and in directing attention to a legislative remedy.7
  In her testimony before Congress, for example, Ledbetter echoed 
Justice Ginsburg’s emphasis on the isolation many women feel when 
they first integrate the workplace.8 Both Ledbetter and Justice Gins-
burg used the pronoun “you” to speak directly to other women. At the 
same time that Ledbetter’s story animated Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent amplified Ledbetter’s own voice. Suitably em-
boldened, this Alabama grandmother went before Congress to speak 
directly to women about their shared fears of making waves in a male- 
dominated environment:
Justice Ginsburg hit the nail on the head when she said that the ma-
jority’s rule just doesn’t make sense in the real world. “You can’t ex-
pect people to go around asking their coworkers how much they are 
making. Plus, even if you know some people are getting paid a little 
more than you, that is no reason to suspect discrimination right away. 54
Especially when you work at a place like I did, where you are the only 
woman in a male-dominated factory, you don’t want to make waves 
unnecessarily. You want to try to fit in and get along.”9
  Justice Ginsburg also continued to engage in a more public discourse 
about the Ledbetter case and her role as an oral dissenter. In an October 
007 speech posted on the Supreme Court website, she parodied the 
majority’s reasoning: “‘Sue early on,’ the majority counseled, when it is 
uncertain whether discrimination accounts for the pay disparity you are 
beginning to experience, and when you may not know that men are re-
ceiving more for the same work. (Of course, you will likely lose such a 
less-than-fully baked case.)”0 As reframed by Justice Ginsburg, Ledbet-
ter’s story was not about a negligent plaintiff who waited an unconscio-
nably long time to sue; it was about an ordinary woman struggling to 
comprehend and eventually document the pay disparities in her all-male 
work environment. Justice Ginsburg frankly acknowledged the zigzag 
trajectory of change, especially given the real-world employment chal-
lenges such a woman faces. In “propel[ling] change,” her oral dissent 
had to “sound an alarm”	that would be heard by members of Congress, 
Lilly Ledbetter, and women’s rights advocates more generally. Her dis-
sent had “to attract immediate public attention.”
  Eventually social activists, legal advocacy groups, media translators, 
legislators, and “role-literate participants” (in Reva Siegel’s terminology) 
not only heard but acted upon the alarm bells Ginsburg sounded. Marcia 
Greenberger of the National Women’s Law Center was one of those “role-
literate participants” who helped carry Justice Ginsburg’s message for-
ward. Greenberger characterized Ginsburg’s oral dissent as a “clarion call” 
to the American people “that the Court is headed in the wrong direc-
tion.”4 Lilly Ledbetter became another such participant as her story, with 
Justice Ginsburg’s assistance, helped ground and frame the discourse.5 
And for the first time in more than a decade, Congress pushed back 
against the Supreme Court. In January 009, Lilly Ledbetter’s name was 
enshrined in history when Congress passed and President Barack Obama 
signed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.655
  In her Ledbetter dissent and subsequent remarks, Justice Ginsburg was 
courting the people to reverse the decision of a Supreme Court majority 
and thereby limit its effect. In Robert Cover’s “jurisgenerative” sense,7 
she claimed a space for citizens to advance alternative interpretations of 
the law. Her oral dissent and public remarks represented a set of demo-
sprudential practices for instantiating and reinforcing the relationship be-
tween public engagement and institutional legitimacy.
  In Justice Ginsburg’s oral dissent we see the possibilities of a more 
democratically oriented jurisprudence, or what Gerald Torres and I term 
demosprudence.8	Demosprudence builds on the idea that lawmaking is 
a collaborative enterprise between formal elites—whether judges, legisla-
tors, or lawyers—and ordinary people. The foundational hypothesis of 
demosprudence is that the wisdom of the people should inform the law-
making enterprise in a democracy. From a demosprudential perspective, 
the Court gains a new source of democratic authority when its members 
engage ordinary people in a productive dialogue about the potential role 
of “We the People” in lawmaking.9
  Demosprudence is a term Professor Torres and I initially coined to de-
scribe the process of making and interpreting law from an external—not 
just internal—perspective. That perspective emphasizes the role of informal 
democratic mobilizations and wide-ranging social movements that serve to 
make formal institutions, including those that regulate legal culture, more 
democratic.40 Demosprudence focuses on the ways that “the demos” (espe-
cially through social movements) can contribute to the meaning of law.
  Justice Ginsburg acted demosprudentially when she invited a wider audi-
ence into the conversation about one of the core conflicts at the heart of our 
democracy.4 She grounded her oral dissent and her public remarks in a set 
of demosprudential practices that linked public engagement with institu-
tional legitimacy. Those practices are part of a larger demosprudential claim: 
that the Constitution belongs to the people, not just to the Supreme Court.
  The dissenting opinions, especially the oral dissents, of Justice Ginsburg 
and other members of the Court are the subject of my 008 Supreme Court 
foreword, Demosprudence Through Dissent.4 The foreword was addressed 56
to judges, especially those speaking out in dissent, urging them to “engage 
dialogically with nonjudicial actors and to encourage them to act demo-
cratically.”4 The foreword focuses on oral dissents because of the special 
power of the spoken word, but Justices can issue demosprudential con-
currences and even majority opinions, written as well as spoken.44 More-
over, true to its origins, demosprudence is not limited to reconceptualizing 
the judicial role. Lawyers and nonlawyers alike can be demosprudential, a 
claim that I foreshadow in the foreword and which Torres and I are devel-
oping in other work on law and social movements.45
  Supreme Court Justices can play a democracy-enhancing role by ex-
panding the audience for their opinions to include those unlearned in 
the law.	Of the current Justices, Justice Antonin Scalia has a particular 
knack for attracting and holding the attention of a nonlegal audience. His 
dissents are “deliberate exercises in advocacy” that “chart new paths for 
changing the law.”46 Just as Justice Ginsburg welcomed women’s rights 
activists into the public sphere in response to the Court majority’s decision 
in Ledbetter, Justice Scalia’s dissents are often in conversation with a con-
servative constituency of accountability.47 By writing dissents like these, 
both Justices have acknowledged that their audience is not just their col-
leagues or the litigants in the cases before them. Both exemplify the poten-
tial power of demosprudential dissents when the dissenter is aligned with 
a social movement or constituency that “mobilizes to change the meaning 
of the Constitution over time.”48 Thus, Justice Ginsburg speaks in her 
“clearest voice” when she addresses issues of gender equality.49 Similarly, 
Justice Scalia effectively uses his originalist jurisprudence as “a language 
that a political movement can both understand and rally around.”50 Both 
Justices Ginsburg and Scalia are at their best as demosprudential dissent-
ers when they encourage a “social movement to fight on.”5
  Robert Post, writing in this volume, reads my argument exactly right: 
“[C]ourts do not end democratic debate about the meaning of rights 
and law; they are participants within such debate.”5 As Post explains, the 
“meaning of constitutional principles are forged within the cauldron of 
political debate,” a debate in which judges are often important, though not 57
necessarily central, actors.5 Law and politics are in continuous dialogue, 
and the goal of a demosprudential dissenter is to ensure that the views of 
a judicial majority do not preempt political dialogue. When Justice Gins-
burg spoke in a voice more conversational than technical, she did more 
than declare her disagreement with the majority’s holding. By vigorously 
speaking out during the opinion announcement, she also appealed to citi-
zens in terms that laypersons could understand and to Congress directly.54 
This is demosprudence.
m
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